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Abstract
Within Reinforcement Learning, there is a fledgling approach to conceptualizing the environment in terms
of predictions. Central to this predictive approach is the assertion that it is possible to construct ontolo-
gies in terms of predictions about sensation, behaviour, and time—to categorize the world into entities
which express all aspects of the world using only predictions. This construction of ontologies is integral
to predictive approaches to machine knowledge where objects are described exclusively in terms of how
they are perceived. In this paper, we ground the Pericean model of semiotics in terms of Reinforcement
Learning Methods, describing Peirce’s Three Categories in the notation of General Value Functions. Using
the Peircean model of semiotics, we demonstrate that predictions alone are insufficient to construct an on-
tology; however, we identify predictions as being integral to the meaning-making process. Moreover, we
discuss how predictive knowledge provides a particularly stable foundation for semiosis—the process of
making meaning—and suggest a possible avenue of research to design algorithmic methods which con-
struct semantics and meaning using predictions.
Keywords: Reinforcement Learning, General Value Functions, Philosophy,
Epistemology, Semantics.
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1 Predictive Approaches to Machine Knowledge
A foundational problem of machine intelligence is being able to conceptualize the environment—to con-
struct ontologies of categories and concepts which enable meaningful decision making and problem solv-
ing. Furthermore, it is normally assumed that such ontologies are dependent upon knowledge; and so it
is no surprise that each approach to machine intelligence—from expert systems to machine learning meth-
ods—aims to build systems approaching human-level understanding of their environment based on differ-
ing assumptions about what knowledge is and what counts as it. Within Reinforcement learning, there is
a fledgling approach to knowledge building sometimes called predictive knowledge: a collection of learning
methods and architectural proposals which seek to describe the world exclusively in terms of sensation,
behaviour, and time (Sutton, 2009).
What separates predictive knowledge from other machine intelligence proposals is a focus on, and require-
ment of, methods which have three capacities: the ability to 1) self-verify knowledge through continual
interaction with the environment, 2) describe knowledge exclusively in terms of observations from the en-
vironment, and 3) scale learning methods (Sutton et al., 2011). While each of the requirements is important
to operationalizing predictive knowledge, they are in service of a greater, unmentioned requirement: the
ability to construct an ontology through interaction with the environment. Many other learning methods
assume that ontological categories are given to the agent, either by hand-crafting properties and relation-
ships to describe the world (as is done in knowledge bases), or providing explicit ontological categorization
during supervised learning. Predictive Knowledge is liberated from this engineering process by focusing
on learning methods which construct their own categories, properties, and relationships to describe the
environment.
While promising, it is unclear to what extent ontologies constructed through predictive knowledge frame-
works accomplish the task of conceptualizing the environment. Certainly there is some degree of success in
using predictions to support control and decision-making (Modayil and Sutton, 2014; Edwards et al., 2016;
Günther et al., 2016), but there are also roadblocks to progress which seem to indicate a problem with the
foundations of the framework. For instance, tasks such as reasoning about objects in terms of sensorimotor
experience in predictive terms (Koop, 2008) has proven to be exceptionally challenging—a task which is rel-
atively simple for supervised learning systems, and other learning methods with hand-crafted ontologies.
This difficulty to express general concepts using predictions is sometimes referred to as the abstraction gap.
At root, and so in service of the three requirements above, the predictive knowledge project proposes that
value functions hold the meaning necessary to construct a successful ontology.1 This paper will proceed
by proposing a framework for understanding meaning which will present a challenge to this stated under-
standing of value functions, the technical implications of which will then be discussed. Importantly, we find
that Predictive Knowledge does not yet meet the threshold for meaning that is necessary to accomplish the
ontological construction sought after by the project of Predictive Knowledge.
2 The Building Blocks of Meaning: a Less Deadly Triad
There is a long standing approach to the construction of meaning in academic literature outside of Com-
puter Science and Machine Intelligence; namely, semiotics. Despite particular theoretical differences, the
basic idea behind positions in semiotics is that meaning is a relational product of ‘signifiers’ (or, words and
language) and the ‘signified’ (or, objects and the world). For instance, Saussure argued that the meaning for
some word was defined by its relative place in the broader structure of the relevant language—i.e. dog does
not mean cat (and vice-versa) precisely because the structure of the English language has unique places,
laid out by interpreters through practice, wherein dog and cat cannot be interchanged. Thus, there is the sig-
nified (one’s actual pet) and it stands in relation to a structured ontology of signifiers (of words one might
use, or not use, to describe their pet).
Of course, put so broadly, semiotics as an approach to linguistic meaning is simultaneously compatible
with a wide variety of other methodological approaches and philosophical commitments, and prone to
questioning and conflict. Consequently, to see how semiotics may help design machine learning methods
1This is made clear in some conceptual projects(Sutton, 2009; Koop, 2008; Sutton et al., 2011); however, it is worth
noting that in engineering projects which focus on using predictions to support decision making, it is likely that the
claim of predictions as being relevant is likely only implicit, if intended at all.
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capable of independently constructing ontologies, the discussion must be narrowed from the broader the-
oretical terrain to one particular view. To that end, we focus on the Peircean model of semiotics for two
reasons: 1) Peircean semiotics is not limited to the domain of language, but instead, tackles the broadest
domain possible with the notion of a sign (CP 1.339)2, making it applicable to the analysis of machine intel-
ligence methods; and 2) Peircean semiotics particularly emphasizes the process of agent interaction rather
than the resulting ‘language’ or ontological structure (CP 1.341), making it uniquely suitable to analysis of
Reinforcement Learning methods.
At amacroscopic level, Peirce’s semiotics is often described as a triadic relation between an object, a signifier,
and an interpretation. For example, a bonfire at a campsite could be an object; the smoke it gives off could
be its signifier; and the conclusion that one draws (or, interpretation) could be that “people are in the forest.”
One may note that under the Peircean model, signifiers are not only words or the perspective of agents, but
can also be objects in the world. This leads to two immediate confusions: 1) that there is a multiplicity to
the interpretation of signs (it is not clear the the ’right’ signifier is the smoke, or the fire, or that the ’right’
interpretation is that there are people in the forest); and 2) that signs are not isolated or fixed, but instead
are linked together (a ’complete’ sign between smoke, fire and the interpretation of people, might itself be
the signifier of another larger, more complex sign). However, despite these points of potential confusion,
the model nonetheless provides a framework for evaluating meaning: smoke means people are present due
to the combination of relations inherent between smoke and fire, fire and people, and the interpretive step
an agent takes in relating their environment and experiences to these relations. The crux of this model is
thus the third aspect of agent interpretation rather than simply the sets of relations between phenomena.
Indeed, to go into further detail, one will find that the triadic model is derivative of Peirce’s Theory of
Mind.3 What can be shown is that the semiotic model depends upon, what is normally called, the Three
Categories; andwhichwewill refer to here as Sensation, Perception, andGenerality.4 First, before abstractions—
or conceptualizations—can be constructed, there must be the information or sensation from which one can
construct the abstraction, absent of any categorization, modelling, or understanding. Thus, Sensation is the
observation an agent receives from the environment without further analysis, comparison, or relation. In
the linguistic semiotic model, this would be the smoke as smoke—a signifier without a corresponding object
or interpretation, something merely sensed.
Of course, our concepts and thoughts are not simply composed of raw, unprocessed sensation. A sensation
of smoke and a sensation of fire are related through our perception and environment construction regard-
less of any particular meaning. Consider, for example, how classical conditioning describes fixed responses to
stimuli, such as blinking, which do not require higher level conceptual cognition. Thus the second compo-
nent of the triad, Perception, describes both the properties which our environment is in terms of and how
each property relates to different sensations. Within predictive knowledge and machine learning, this no-
tion of Perception, can be found in many places: i.e. a prediction’s estimate, or the value of a state action
pair.
Now, it may seem unclear why one needs a third part. There are moments sensed and perceptions which
relate them; what else could there be, or must there be? Some reflection, however, may reveal the shortcom-
ings of this diadic relationship. To think again of our campsite, one’s sensation of smoke may bring about
the perceptual relation of fire—the two go together after all, like blinking—but there are many further ex-
periences which come with fire. Sometimes there really is a campsite and people roasting marshmallows,
other times lightning strikes, or dry heat and unkempt brush may bring an unwelcome end to celebratory
fireworks. Which conclusion one draws from the sensation of smoke—that is, what the smoke means—is
thus the application of a broader general concept (say, campfire as compared to forest fire). The useful se-
lection of one broader concept over another may require a rich background of experience and learned
relations (between, say, the volume of smoke and the colour of the horizon, or the smell of burning pine),
but is nonetheless an active cognitive step wherein a general notion is applied to a particular case—that the
source of this smoke, and so this fire, is people and not lightning. This third category, the relation of general
patterns to particular instances, is what we have called Generality.
2We refer to Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce by CP m.n, where m is the volume number and n is the paragraph
number, as is custom in Peircean scholarship.
3The full scope of which is, unfortunately, beyond this paper.
4Peirce refers to these categories as Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness; however, despite the systematic function
that these categories play throughout his theories, we eschew this naming schema for both clarity and applicability. See
CP 1.300 onwards for relevant discussion.
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3 Is Learning a GVF a Semiotic Process?
Thus far we have presented the parallels between AI and semiotics speculatively and hesitantly, but we
will now develop an extended example covering predictive knowledge and the Three Categories. To do
so, we take a General Value Function (GVF) (White, 2015)—the most basic mechanism of many predictive
knowledge proposals—and evaluate whether learning an approximate value function can be seen as a
triadic relationship; we evaluate whether predicting is a process which produces meaning.
GVFs make predictions estimating the value, or expected discounted sum of a signal C defined as Gt =∑∞
k=0(
∏k
j=1(γt+j))Ct+k+1. Value for some state φ is estimated with respect to a specific policy pi, discount
function 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and cumulant c, such that v(φ;pi, γ, c) = Epi[Gt|St = φ]. Using GVFs, we can ask
questions such as “How long will it take me to bump into a wall if I keep walking forwards”? These GVFs
are typically learnt online through interaction between an agent and its world over discrete time-steps. On
each time-step t = 0, 1, 2, ..., n the agent receives a vector ot that describes what is sensed, and takes an
action at. Prior to use or feature construction, the observations ot received by the system are Sensation: the
first component of the Three Categories.
The observations, with some function approximator, are used to produce the agent state: a feature vector φt :
ot → R
n which describes the environment from the agent’s perspective5. This state φt is used in conjunction
with some learning method to estimate the discounted sum Gt of future signals C. For our example, we
consider Temporal-Difference (TD) learning (Sutton, 1988); however, our conclusions will generalize to
other policy evaluation methods. When performing TD learning, we maintain some weight parameters
w ∈ Rn which when combined with the current state produce the estimated return vpi(φt) = w
⊤
t φt. On each
step, at each instant, the weights are changed proportional to the TD error δt = Ct+1+γt+1vpi(φt+1)−vpi(φt).
When the weights are updated bywt+1 = wt+αtδtφt, the relation between ot, at, and ct is updated based on
some response from the environment. For any given state φt, the estimate vpi(φt) forms a relation between
what is sensed ot, the actions taken at and the signal being predicted ct; thus, value estimates form the
second component of the Three Categories: Perception.
Having come to the end of the process of specifying and learning a GVF, one may wonder where Generality
exists in predictive knowledge. After all, many claim that a single prediction has meaning6, but we have
so far only identified Sensation and Perception. While a GVF may capture a prediction for any given state,
generalizing over observations through some function approximation, it does not capture Generality. When
a prediction is formed as a GVF, our expectation of future signals slurs over all experience, making it im-
possible to relate manifestations of instances of signals in order to compare and contrast them. Using GVFs
alone, we are incapable of, say, identifying that a wall bumped into is the very same as the one we bumped
into both 10 time-steps ago and 100 time-steps ago: we may only say how close an observation was to the
expectation of the whole of an agent’s experience in that particular agent-state.
This limitation in expressing the Three Categories invites us to wonder whether the notion of Sensation,
Perception, and Generality is a productive one: does framing predictive knowledge as a semiotic process
help us better understandmachine intelligence? Aswe previously introduced, there are other approaches to
semiosis, some of which do not depend on Generality7. Simply finding our methods to be meaningful does
not obliviate the limitations of existing predictive knowledge methods. Predictive knowledge frameworks
can be construed as constructing meaning under other definitions of semiotics; however, declaring our
methods to be sufficient does not help predictive knowledge systems cross the abstraction gap and express
concepts which are at present elusive—a declaration of meaning would not suddenly enable Predictive
Knowledge methods to reason about generality, or make it any clearer how notions such as objects would
be formalized in a predictive setting.
How, then, do we surmount the gap between abstract generalities and the relations which inform them?
While predictions alone are insufficient, it may be possible to express generalities by constructing models
using predictions A model-based method which explicitly defines state-action transitions relates not only
one state st to another st+1, but relates states in terms of all the possible transitions given all the possible
5It is worth noting that input observations ot could include not just immediate sensor feedback, but also the previ-
ous action, historical information, or internal signals generated from learning.
6See Sutton et al. (2011) for an example argument for GVFs as having explicit semantics, and both Koop (2008) and
White (2015) for additional discussion of predictions as inherently meaningful.
7For example, (Barbieri, 2007) presents a variety of semiotic models in application to cell biology.
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actions which could have been taken in st. A model which is able to interrelate many predictions such
that contexts can be compared and contrasted could be considered semiotic. For these reasons, difficulty
in constructing generalities does not belong to insufficient learning methods, or poor state construction
(although they do impact progress). The difficulty of constructing abstractions results from an inability to
interrelate what is learned: it is a problem of how we structure predictive knowledge architectures, not how
we learn them.
Does learning a prediction encompass the entirety of a semiotic process? No; however, predictive knowl-
edge could play a central role in a process which is semiotic. GVFs provide a robust and flexible founda-
tion for semiosis by playing the part of Perception. By focusing on incremental learning methods which are
specified in terms of behaviour, GVFs describe a class of predictions which are uniquely suited to be Percep-
tion: methods which are not ontologically constrained by labels—or, what predictive knowledge agents can
conceptualize constrained by the reality of the environment they inhabit, not the labels provided for train-
ing. Moreover, GVFs have proven themselves to be practically useful for reactive behaviour such as pros-
thetic control (Edwards et al., 2016), lazer welding (Günther et al., 2016), and robotics (Modayil and Sutton,
2014)—crucial steps in demonstrating that GVFs are useful in informing decision-making about the envi-
ronment, although insufficient for constructing an ontology of the world.
4 Conclusion: Taking Stock of the Predictive Knowledge Project
Predictive knowledge describes a collection of proposals for constructing machine knowledge which as-
sert that all world knowledge can be described as predictions about sensation, behaviour, and time. In
this paper, we take a first look at the construction of semantics and meaning in predictive knowledge by
evaluating whether or not learning a General Value Function can be construed as a semiotic process. We
demonstrate that GVFs can be seen to fulfill the first two components of semiosis: Sensation and Peception;
however, predictions fall short of providing the third component, Generality. As a result, predictions do not
have meaning independent of any other process. While predictive knowledge proposals do not presently
construct meaning, the project of predictive knowledge is not inherently doomed; quite the opposite, pre-
dictive knowledge provides a promising foundation for construction of meaning in Machine Intelligence.
We suggest that it may be possible to express generalities by using predictions to construct models of the
environment, thereby completing the triadic relation and forming a semiotic process.
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